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Abstract  
What remains of constitutional pluralism in the wake of the Euro crisis? According to 
the new anti‐pluralists, the recent Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) saga signals 
its demise, calling to an end the tense stalemate between the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the German Constitutional Court on the question of ultimate authority. With 
the ECJ’s checkmate, OMT represents a new stage  in  the constitutionalisation of  the 
European Union, towards a  fully monist order. Since constitutional pluralism was an 
inherently  unstable  and  undesirable  compromise,  that  is  both  inevitable  and  to  be 
welcomed.  It  is argued here  that  this  is misguided  in attending  to  the  formal at  the 
expense of the material dimension of constitutional development, which is not to say 
that constitutional pluralism is alive and well; on the contrary it is in a precarious state. 
The material perspective reveals a deeply dysfunctional constitutional dynamic, of which 
the judicial battle in OMT is merely a surface reflection. This dynamic now reaches a critical 
conjuncture,  encapsulated  in  the debate over  ‘Grexit’,  and  the material  conflict between 
solidarity and austerity. Constitutional pluralism, in conclusion, may be worth defending, but 
as a normative plea for the co‐existence of a horizontal plurality of constitutional orders. This 
requires radical constitutional re‐imagination of the European project. 
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1. Introduction 
Is constitutional pluralism – so long a dominant referent in the constitutional theory 
of the European Union - another casualty of the Euro crisis? It has recently been argued 
that the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) ruling of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), in response to the first preliminary reference ever submitted by the 
German Constitutional Court, signposts its demise. 1  Specifically, the ECJ’s strident 
defence of the supremacy of EU law over national law, and of its own authority to 
determine the boundaries of the EU’s competence (the so-called judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz) in the face, initially, of fierce resistance from the German court, has elicited 
its obituary. 2 
Developed in the wake of the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht Urteil, 
constitutional pluralism captured the uneasy but apparently functional compromise 
between the German court and the ECJ on the question of who has the ultimate 
authority to determine the validity of EU and by extension domestic law.3 The answer 
of the pluralists, in short, was that both enjoy that authority within their own 
jurisdictions and, provided each treat their authority and the authority of the other 
with caution, respect and discretion, outright conflict could be avoided and openness 
(or ambiguity) on the question of the final arbiter retained.  
This arrangement, thought to be based on mutual accommodation and informal dialogue, 
is now said to have been brought to a close, ironically, with the first ever ‘formal’ 
conversation between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg. After OMT, the new anti-pluralists 
contend, constitutional pluralism can be presumed dead, obsolete in the EU’s present phase 
of integration.4 
The current demise of constitutional pluralism is then read as a sign of its immanent 
dysfunctionality: a chronicle of a death foretold. The tense compromise between 
judicial authorities would inevitably have collapsed eventually; it would then be 
undesirable because the rule of law requires certainty and uniformity of application. 
This could only be guaranteed by an unequivocal acceptance of the supremacy of EU 
law and of the authority of the ECJ to interpret EU law and determine questions of 
legal validity decisively and for all member states, without national reservations. When 
                                                          
1 See F. Fabbrini, ‘After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of 
the Member States’, (2015) 16 German Law Journal, 1003-1024; D. Kelemen, ‘On the Unsustainability of 
Constitutional Pluralism’ in F. Fabbrini (ed.) ‘The ECJ, the ECB and the Supremacy of EU Law: Special 
Issue’, (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 136-151.  
2  Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag EU: C: 2015: 400 (16 June 2015); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13 (14 January 2014, 21 
June 2016).  
3 See N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’, (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 259-266; N. 
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review, 317-
359. For a representative collection of essays on constitutional pluralism, including its later iterations, see M. 
Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 
See most recently, N. Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’, (2016) 22 European Law Journal, 333–355.  
4 F. Fabbrini, D. Kelemen, op. cit. 
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contest spilled over into conflict, transnational legality would be threatened. 
Functional and normative arguments are thus conflated into one fierce indictment – 
constitutional pluralism is not only an ‘oxymoron’,5 it is also based on an ‘illogical’ and 
even ‘immoral’ concession to domestic legal authority, permitting a form of national 
‘cherry picking’ in a way that violates basic principles of member state equality.6 The 
ECJ’s victory in OMT should therefore be celebrated and European constitutional 
monism fully embraced.7  
It is argued here that the focus of these attacks on constitutional pluralism and their 
celebration of EU judicial supremacy is misplaced, one-sided in attending to the formal 
at the expense of the material dimensions of constitutional development. This elision 
obscures the dysfunctional evolution of the EU, particularly since the Euro crisis, a dys-
functionality that will not be resolved by judicial fiat alone and may well be aggravated 
by it. 
To see why, we need to look beyond the judicial skirmish in OMT, which is but a 
surface reflection of more expansive and evolving political, institutional and 
ideological battles raging throughout the Eurozone and the EU as a whole. The Court 
in OMT rubber-stamps a central bank programme deemed essential to the Euro’s 
survival, but which has doubtful constitutional credentials and is based on a rationale 
that looks increasingly shaky, the ‘irreversibility’ of the Euro. However decisive OMT 
may be for the question of legal authority and judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the wider 
battle for political authority over the Euro and over the EU continues to be fought. 
OMT is not incidental to the material outcome of this political contestation, but it is far 
from decisive. 
This wider sense of unease is exposed by the fact that those advocating the ECJ’s 
unequivocal juridical supremacy, and celebrating its stark assertion in OMT, resort to 
balancing it against a crude reassertion of member state sovereignty: a constitutional 
balance is maintained because the ultimate political authority to withdraw (or 
renegotiate membership) remains vested firmly with the member states. If it was once 
held that exit was unthinkable, only a formal option, this authority, since the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum, no longer looks merely hypothetical. In the anti-pluralist account, in other 
words, OMT represents a purely juridical federal constitutional moment, supposedly 
balanced by a resolutely anti-federal political authority. 
It is a curious form of integration that relies for its affirmation on the continuing pos-
sibility and (growing) threat of political disintegration. It tells us little about how 
political authority is materially transformed in the interim (including through member-
ship of the Eurozone itself). Focusing on the assertion of judicial hierarchy not only 
ignores that what is at stake is a controversial programme of central bank fiat, it also 
overlooks the fragmentary and centrifugal forces generated by, and through the 
                                                          
5 M. Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism, 9–30.  
6 D. Kelemen, op. cit, 139.  
7 F. Fabbrini, op. cit.,  1023: ‘As much as the prospect of a nullification of the ECB OMT program by the 
BVerfG sheds dark clouds on the future of the EU, the case may serve as the opportunity to clarify once 
and for all that, in our Union of states, no state court is above the common law.’ 
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response to, the Euro crisis. In the Eurozone, these were highlighted by the mooted 
suggestion of ‘Grexit’ from the single currency, casting into doubt the ‘irreversibility’ 
of the Euro which was used to justify OMT as well as the voluntariness of Euro 
membership.  
Constitutional pluralism, in any meaningful sense, must capture this complex 
dynamic of constitutional change, formal and material, integrating national and 
supranational domains as part of a single movement. 8  With this in mind, the 
significance of constitutional pluralism, far from disappearing, is heightened in 
response to an increasingly asymmetric union, captured not only by the increasing 
dominance of executive powers in the EU and its member states (including the 
European Central Bank (ECB) itself), but by imbalances between larger and smaller, 
and creditor and debtor nations. It is also heightened by the ideological ruptures and 
anti-systemic backlashes across the region, both in the periphery and in the core of 
Europe. 9  Judicial relations are an important part of this picture, but they are just a 
part. The fact that even judicial relations are spilling over into outright conflict is a 
significant but surface reflection of these deeper material conflicts.  
A fuller viewpoint suggests that, normatively, constitutional pluralism should not be 
abandoned but rather reframed as an ideal: the political co-existence of a ‘horizontal 
plurality’ of domestic constitutional orders. The challenge for constitutional pluralists, 
in other words, is different from that highlighted by many of its proponents (as well 
as detractors). Rather than a question of how national and European juridical 
authorities can coexist without formal hierarchy, the pressing question, revealed in 
force since the Euro crisis, is how national constitutionalisms can materially co-coexist 
in a harmonious (and heterarchical) fashion. To put it crudely, how, within the political 
association, can the German constitution cohabit with the Greek, where one demands 
the austerity measures that the other proscribes? If the project of European integration 
was meant to provide a solution to this problem of material constitutional co-existence, 
it is a project in need of serious reassessment.  
The paper proceeds as follows: First, it presents the case for OMT signalling the end of 
constitutional pluralism and signposting a new stage in the process of constitutional-
isation of the European Union (part 2). Some internal doubts are then expressed about 
the force and coherence of this position, both functionally and normatively (part 3). 
More problematically, however, the position misrepresents constitutional phenomena 
by supposing an untenable dualism between legal and political authority (part 4). 
What is required to remedy this defect is a material account of constitutional change 
(part 5). This suggests an increasingly dysfunctional trajectory, amounting to a 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., N. Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’ in G. de Burca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) The Worlds 
of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). More recently, Walker 
notes that constitutional pluralism must ‘reach beneath the legal topsoil to deeper political roots’ and 
be considered, ‘as much a matter of political theory as of legal theory’, see N. Walker, ‘Revisited’, op. 
cit., 3.  
9  Anti-systemic pressures extend beyond the troubles associated with ‘Brexit’ and ‘Grexit’, as 
demonstrated by the concerns over constitutional developments in Poland and Hungary, specifically 
over the safeguarding of the rule of law. Those developments are largely beyond the scope of this article.  
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constitutional conjuncture in the present Euro crisis phase, which materially threatens 
constitutional pluralism (part 6). In response, I argue for a reframing of constitutional 
pluralism rather than for the abandonment of the idea altogether (part 7).  
Otherwise, I suggest in conclusion, the EU will struggle to maintain its animating 
ideals (part 8).  
2. The end of the affair?  
Did the compromise and accommodation between national courts and the ECJ come 
to an end with the first ever occasion on which Karlsruhe used the court-to-court 
procedure? The idea of a ‘dialogue’ between domestic and European courts was first 
inspired by its early Solange jurisprudence.10 This was in reality less a dialogue than a 
standoff, each court insisting on the ultimate authority to determine the boundaries of 
legal validity, but holding off on pulling the trigger provided certain guarantees were 
met – relating in the first instance to fundamental rights. The post-Solange framework 
reconciled clashing claims to ultimate authority on the basis of provisional yielding: 
each court would yield to the other so long as a minimal threshold of respect for its 
basic values was upheld.11 
Pluralist and experimentalist scholars viewed these competing authority claims in a 
potentially positive light.12 In practice, formal divergence on the issue of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz would be mitigated by the propensity to forge increasing points of material 
convergence, as the Solange jurisprudence was seen as a kind of legal educational tool. 
13 In practice, the dynamic between domestic and European legal orders pushed the 
system as a whole to develop a greater concern for fundamental rights, omitted for 
historical reasons from the founding Treaties but incorporated by the ECJ into the 
unwritten general principles of law under pressure from German and Italian courts.14  
Overall, a non-hierarchical constitutional arrangement could endure and even prosper, 
with no one constitutional system ultimately superior to the other but with each 
remaining autonomous and supreme within its sphere of influence – not ships passing 
in the night, but a flotilla coordinating, or fortuitously converging, in its path forward, 
without an overall captain. Metaphors of musical harmony were proffered to capture 
the overall coherence of the various parts.15 The question of ultimate authority could 
thus be left open as long as a shared normative core or overlapping consensus could 
                                                          
10 Solange refers to the principles established by the German Constitutional Court in Solange I [1974] 2 CMLR 
540 and Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft (‘Solange II’), BverfG 1986 [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
11 See e.g. A. Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 19.  
12 See e.g. C. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and 
the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’  (2010) 16 European Law Journal, 511-550. 
13  See e.g. M. Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological 
Pluralism’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 415–456. 
14  Cf. B-O. Bryde, ‘The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – A Milestone in Transnational 
Constitutionalism’ in M. P. Maduro and L. M. Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010). 
15 See M. P. Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as it Gets?’ in J. H. H. Weiler and M. 
Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 98.  
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be maintained, based on the immanent rationality of shared liberal-democratic 
principle. ‘Proportionality’ would later emerge as the ubiquitous tool for solving any 
conflict or tension that might arise between these normative orders in their concrete 
application. The idea was even transferred upwards to the relation between the European 
and international order, offering the potential for a globalised Solange doctrine.16  
It is worth recalling, however, that the judgment that launched constitutional 
pluralism in earnest and inspired its subsequent iterations was ultimately a feint.17 The 
Maastricht Court, just like its Lisbon successor, in practice surrendered, albeit each 
time the gap between its rhetoric and its ruling grew ever wider. As Christoph 
Schönberger described its Lisbon Treaty decision: ‘there is probably no other judgment 
in the history of the Karlsruhe Court in which the argument is so much at odds with 
the actual result’.18  
They were clear signs that the compromise between national constitutional courts and 
the ECJ was reaching breaking point.19 In particular, on the issue of extradition under 
the European Arrest Warrant, national constitutional courts increasingly struggled to 
reconcile domestic rights with their EU commitments, or had to insist on domestic 
constitutional amendments.20 The problems were in reality even wider and deeper.21 
On the specific question of juridical authority, any truce had in fact already technically 
broken, the Czech court ruling a decision of the European Court of Justice ultra vires in 
a dispute over pensions but this was essentially a domestic battle of little consequence 
for the EU’s overall constitutional authority and stability.22 
OMT, however, appeared to represent a turning point. It was clear that the reference 
from Karlsruhe was not launched in the spirit of accommodation or judicial comity 
and in an area of tremendous political, economic and even existential significance for 
the EU. Finally, the German court’s argument and its results seemed to match. 
But why was OMT a watershed? For one thing, accusations of methodological 
nationalism against Karlsruhe, hitherto of greater theoretical than practical import, 
were now pregnant with moment, specifically its potential to empower the German 
organs of state in any bailout negotiations by offering them the opportunity to play 
                                                          
16  See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I- 
6351. 
17 See J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 European 
Law Journal, 303-309. See also J .H. H. Weiler, ‘Demos, Telos and the Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 
European Law Journal, 219–258. It is curious that a judgment that had received so much initial 
opprobrium was retrospectively blessed with the imprimatur of a near-universally acclaimed doctrinal 
innovation. 
18 C. Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karslruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal, 1201-1218. 
19 See BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 (6 July 2010). 
20 See recently BVerfG, Order No. 2 BvR 2735/14, (15 December 2015) 
21 For an examination of these tensions, see e.g. F. De Witte, ‘Sex, Drugs and EU Law’ (2013) 50 Common 
Market Law Review, 1545–1578.  
22 Case no. Pl. S 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII, (31 January 2012) 
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the ‘Karlsruhe card’: ‘our court won’t let us!’23 In a scenario where creditor power was 
becoming ever weightier in bargaining over loan conditionality, specifically in 
pressing for ordo-liberal principles of fiscal discipline, this was of considerable 
political-economic significance. The substantial subtext of OMT was apparent: the ECB 
must not subvert or bypass the conditionality (‘austerity’) imposed on debtor states 
under European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the various bilateral and multilateral 
loans by a back-door programme of bond-buying, with the ECB offering itself as a de 
facto lender of last resort. 
From the perspective of the ECB, the OMT programme was essential to maintaining 
the financial stability and ‘singleness’ of the currency, which had – rightly or wrongly 
- become a symbol of the success of the project of European integration itself. ‘Draghi’s 
bazooka’, it should be recalled, alongside his announcement that the ‘Euro is 
irreversible’, had been credited with calming the financial markets, preventing 
contagion in other member states, especially Spain and Italy, and possibly saving the 
single currency.24 At the very least, it performed the act of ‘buying time’, delaying the 
crisis of democratic capitalism unfolding across the Eurozone, and elsewhere, as 
Wolfgang Streeck has observed.25 Additionally, if revamped along lines offered by the 
German court, OMT could be rendered ineffective, and the prospects dashed of economic 
stability in a very fragile polity.26 
The German court compounded the difficulty by the manner of the referral and the 
particular intertwining of German constitutional law and EU legality. Karlsruhe 
indicated that if unchanged, the OMT programme should be declared illegal, not only 
on the basis only of EU law (OMT violating the division of competences between the 
EU and the member states, and specifically ultra vires the powers of the ECB), but of 
German constitutional identity (OMT violating the right of the German citizen to vote 
for the Bundestag due to its potential impact on budgetary autonomy and the 
‘democratic discourse’ of German society). 27  The German court construed 
constitutional identity idiosyncratically, divorcing its own doctrine from the more 
holistic perspective offered in Article 4(2) Treaty of the European Union (TEU).28 Core 
German constitutional identity, it claimed, is exclusive and non-negotiable,29 not only 
                                                          
23 See F. Mayer, ‘Rebels without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT 
Reference’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 111-146. 
24 See E. Jones, ‘The Forgotten Financial Union: How You Can Have a Euro Crisis Without A Euro’ in M. 
Matthijs and M. Blyth (eds) The Future of the Euro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63–64. 
25 See W. Streeck, Buying Time: Reflections on the Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014)  
26 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, op. cit., para 100: conditions of judicial guarantees of limited purchasing, no 
debt restructuring and avoidance of market interference (which were anyway ‘untestable’, see K. 
Schneider, ‘Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe’s Request for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 217- 239, 231). 
27 Ibid., paras 26–30, 48.   
28 Ibid., para 29. 
29 ‘[I]dentity review is not to be assessed according to Union law but exclusively according to German 
Constitutional Law’, according to the German court, ibid., para 103.  
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immune to balancing of any sort against other interests but also exclusively for the 
federal constitutional court to interpret.30  
The double-pronged nature of this attack was significant, blurring the lines between 
the European and domestic legal orders, and putting the Luxembourg court in a 
difficult position. Even if declared by the ECJ to be within the powers of the ECB on a 
formal reading of EU law, the German court could declare it a violation of national 
constitutional identity. If so, OMT would be valid in the EU legal order with the 
exception of Germany (as a matter of German law). But without Germany’s 
participation, i.e. without the support of the Bundesbank, which the German court 
could order to withdraw from OMT, the programme would be significantly less 
economically effective, if at all. Its credibility, which is what matters on the financial 
markets, would be shattered. The threat was clear: Germany’s economic power 
threatened to turn into a quasi-constitutional authority for the Eurozone as a whole.   
The ECJ, however, stood firm. On the question of the authority to determine the 
legality of acts of EU institutions, including of the ECB, the Court of Justice was 
adamant about its exclusive authority; its ruling would be ‘definitive’. 31  On the 
material question of ultra vires, the Court of Justice granted a wide margin of discretion 
to the ECB, amounting to what might be called a ‘featherweight’ review of its actions. 
The ECJ determines that in a ‘controversial’ area like monetary policy, nothing can be 
required of the ECB except that it use its expertise ‘with all care and accuracy’. 
Unsurprisingly, given this level of deference, the Court found no ‘manifest error of 
judgment’.32 
Karlsruhe did obtain rhetorical guarantees that fiscal discipline would be maintained 
in the context of any actual triggering of OMT. Rhetorical because in practice, OMT’s 
effect on fiscal discipline were already very real, OMT reducing yields in Spain and 
Italy without them ever entering into any formal adjustment programmes, a point that 
needs to be kept in mind for understanding the broader political and economic context 
of this constitutional conflict.33 
With the case returning to Karlsruhe, the fight was not over. But for the anti-pluralists, 
the ECJ’s ruling signified that the curtain had been drawn on the play of constitutional 
pluralism, whatever Karlsruhe’s response: if Karlsruhe conceded, it would signal 
concession of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the ECJ, and the triumph of the unqualified 
supremacy of EU law. If it fought back, refusing to comply, and ordering its organs of 
state to frustrate the OMT programme, by, for example, obstructing participation of 
the Bundesbank, Germany would be in breach of EU law and should be pursued 
                                                          
30 Ibid., para 29. For analysis, see M. Claes and J. Reestman, ‘The Protection of National Constitutional Identity 
and the Limits of Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal, 917-970. 
31 Gauweiler, op. cit., para 14. Unlike the Advocate General, the ECJ did not even make reference to Article 
4(2) TEU or of any process of balancing between the authority of EU law and national constitutional identity.  
32 Ibid., para 75. 
33 See E. Jones, op. cit. See further, M. Wilkinson, ‘The Euro is Irreversible! … Or is it? On OMT, Austerity 
and the Threat of Grexit’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal, 1049-172. 
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through infringement proceedings.34 Either way, therefore, OMT signalled the end of 
the compromise that had been embraced by so many constitutional scholars of 
European integration. OMT, in other words, signposted a new stage in the process of 
the constitutionalisation of the European Union.  
The reality was more muddled. Although the German court held off on an outright 
rejection of the legality of the programme, it maintained serious objections to the way 
the case was treated by the ECJ. It insisted on the Federal Government and the 
Bundestag retaining surveillance over conformity with the stipulated conditions, placing 
both ‘under a duty to monitor closely any implementation of the OMT programme’.35 
According to the anti-pluralists, however, the affair between Karlsruhe and 
Luxembourg needs to end, in order for the EU to reach constitutional ‘maturity’.36 
Judicial disagreement on who has the ultimately authority to decide issues as basic as 
the validity of an EU measure is unsustainable in the long run. Constitutional 
pluralism is a conceptual ‘fudge’, designed to obfuscate the fact that ‘ultimately, in any 
constitutional order worthy of the name, some judicial authority must have the final 
say’.37 At some point, the delicate compromise between domestic and European courts 
would inevitably collapse, and, when it did, equilibrium would need to be restored in 
one of two ways: either by national courts (and ultimately member states) conceding 
to the ultimate authority of the European Court of Justice, or by a reversion to domestic 
authority and the unravelling of the constitutional construction of EU law. 38 In case of 
the former, the EU would have witnessed its federal moment. In case of the latter, the 
EU would return to the ordinary international law route of state responsibility, 
counter-measures and reciprocity. 39 In either case, its sui generic status would be lost.40 
                                                          
34 F. Fabbrini, op. cit. To buttress this point, Advocate General Cruz Villalón’s Opinion in Gauweiler is 
relied on. According to the Advocate General, unilateral reservations of authority such as that 
demanded by Karlsruhe would soon lead to constitutional disintegration and it would become ‘an all 
but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute 
reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States’, Opinion in Case C-
62/14 Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:7, para 59. 
35 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13 (Judgment of 21 June 2016). 
See Bundesverfassungsgericht, ‘Constitutional Complaints and Organstreit Proceedings Against the OMT 
Programme of the European Central Bank Unsuccessful’, Press Release No. 34/2016, 21 June 2016.  
36 See D. Kelemen, op. cit., 139. 
37 D. Kelemen, op. cit., 139. Cf. A. Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in M. Avbelj and J. Komarek 
(eds) op. cit, 343 – 381.  
38 D. Kelemen’s solution is in fact a declaration of incompatibility between the domestic constitution 
and continuing membership of the EU. It would lead to one of three calls: for constitutional amendment 
to make the offending domestic constitution conform, for the offending EU measure to be challenged 
and changed through the political process (or the state to secure an opt-out), or, the ‘nuclear option’, to 
demand withdrawal from the EU. Raising the constitutional stakes, would, according to Kelemen, 
actually stabilise the EU legal order, by ‘upping the stakes and increasing the costs of missteps, but at 
the same time reducing the chance of war’, ibid., 150.  
39 Unilateral derogation would ‘destroy the EU legal order’, leading only to ‘chaos’, ibid. 
40 Cf. B. De Witte, ‘The European Union as an International Legal Experiment’ in G. De Burca and J. H. 
H. Weiler (eds), op. cit. 
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There is, an additional, normative case offered by the anti-pluralists against any 
pluralist status quo. The existence of separate, and diverging authorities, potentially 
leading to a situation in which an EU measure would be declared invalid in one 
member state, but remain valid in the other twenty seven, violates the principle of 
Member State equality.41 Legal uniformity in Europe, in other words, must resist any 
particular assertions of constitutional identity, holding an independent and over-
riding value on this view. Disagreement on the question of judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz is such an affront to a basic principle of the rule of law (that law should be 
applied comprehensively and universally within its jurisdiction), that it should trump 
any countervailing concerns.42 There is no place, on their view, for dissent, or for 
‘institutional disobedience’; not even for provisional disagreement. 43 Not a marriage 
of equals, but a clear hierarchy must be installed between national and supranational 
courts, albeit a hierarchy that is justified in the name of equality. 
3. It’s complicated!  
Complex questions can look more facile with the luxury of hindsight. To be sure, a 
strong case can be made against the wisdom of the German court’s referral, attempting 
to use its leverage in a way that left little option for the ECJ but direct confrontation.44 
Although the German court continues to speak of maintaining its ‘friendliness’ 
towards EU law, this understates the point: the German court is also under a duty of 
loyal co-operation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. This requires the Court to consider 
its responsibility not in isolation but as both a national and a European court, and one 
whose judgements reverberate throughout the Union. 45  The German Basic Law 
commits Germany to European integration and international obligations. It is also 
holding itself out as the Guardian of the European Constitution, protecting against the 
illegitimate incursions of a powerful (and also counter-majoritarian) supranational 
institution, the European Central Bank. But if it therefore adopts the broader 
perspective of a European Court, it must take into account values beyond those it 
traditionally protects as a national court. To fail to do so carries the risk of 
‘constitutional hazard’, the risk that the European construct will be conditioned and 
                                                          
41 See F. Fabbrini, op. cit., 1015. But the question of course is precisely what they have agreed to. 
42 Cf. M. Kumm, ‘How does European Union Law Fit Into the World of Public Law?’ in A. Weiner and 
J. Neyer (eds) Political Theory of the EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
43 Cf. T. Isiksel, ‘ Fundamental Rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat’ (2010) 15 European Law 
Journal 551-557.  
44 As persuasively argued in dissenting judgements by Justices Gerhard and Lübbe-Wolf.  
45 As F. Mayer puts it: ‘apparently there is not much room for solidarity beyond the borders of the 
nation-state in the German Constitutional Court’s worldview. Some would even detect a lack of constitutional 
empathy here, considering the fact that concepts the German Constitutional Court invokes quite naturally such 
as self-determination, budgetary autonomy, etc., are not available to other Member States anymore {…]’ op. cit., 
143.  
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even determined by the constitutional power of a domestic court expressing purely 
domestic concerns.46  
Co-operation, however, cuts both ways. The ECJ too must be sensitive to national 
constitutional autonomy, something it is not always seen to have successfully achieved. 
As Fritz Scharpf recently put it, ‘the perceived role of the ECJ is still that of a promoter 
of integration rather than that of a neutral umpire between the EU and its Member 
States.’ 47  OMT strongly confirms this perception albeit at a time when the EU 
constitution has never looked more fragile. 
The ‘new argument’ of respecting member state equality, supposedly violated by 
Karlsruhe in the eyes of the anti-pluralists, is not a new argument at all. In response to 
Karlsruhe’s earlier Lisbon decision, Scharpf had long argued that the German court’s 
jurisprudence fails a test of universalisability. Its Lisbon decision, he argued, is 
‘fundamentally flawed’, failing ‘to consider its generalised implications in the light of 
the Kantian categorical imperative.’48 The Constitution, on this Kantian account, is 
‘founded upon a universal rather than particular principle of democratic 
sovereignty.’49 Karlsruhe fails, in other words, a version of the golden rule of ethics; 
constitutional power must be subject to the moral law.50 
The normative argument is not new, but is it persuasive? On its own, the claim that 
each domestic court deciding unilaterally on opt-outs from European law would 
automatically offend a principle of equality does not follow. One could just as well say, 
on the contrary, that it protects equality by permitting each court to make domestic 
reservations; moreover, in doing so it not only protects formal equality, but also 
respects a deeper sense of constitutional or cultural diversity (in turn respecting a 
fuller principle of substantive equality). Local concerns are better protected by those 
who understand local constitutional culture – this is why constitutional resistance has 
been valued in the EU as a potentially constructive form of institutional disobedience.  
                                                          
46 M. Wilkinson, ‘Economic Messianism and Constitutional Power in a German Europe: All Courts are 
Equal, But Some Are More Equal Than Others’, 2014 (26) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper 
Series. 
47 F. Scharpf, ‘Sovereignty and Democracy in the European Polity: Reflections on Dieter Grimm’s Essay 
“Sovereignty in the European Union”’ in J. Van der Walt and J. Ellsworth (eds) Constitutional Sovereignty 
and Social Solidarity in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 58. 
48 See F. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration: Or Why the EU Cannot be a Social Market 
Economy’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review, 211-250.  
49 F. Scharpf, ibid. See also M. Everson, ‘An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-Writing the Court of Justice 
and the Bundesverfassungsgericht’ (2014) Institute For Advanced Studies Vienna, Political Science Series. 
See also M. Kumm, op. cit., 211. 
50 F. Scharpf: ‘The authority claimed by the German court could of course not be denied to the courts in 
all member states. And while these would surely be equally sensitive to the specific and diverse 
concerns of national autonomy and identity, there is no reason to expect that their understandings of the 
“Europe-friendliness” of their national constitutions would converge, or that they would all assign the same 
relative weights to the European concerns at stake. The overall result might be a chaotic form of differentiated 
integration through an accumulation and perhaps escalation of unilateral national opt-outs’, ‘Asymmetry’, op. 
cit., 242.  
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As Joseph Weiler long argued, constitutional tolerance - the judicial as well as political 
self-discipline to respect the values of the other51 – is a demanding but more legitimate 
basis for a community of equals than a hierarchy of formal norms and authority 
imposed from above. As long as the EU’s constitutional authority is largely parasitic 
upon more robust national versions, this will remain the case.  
It would not, of course, be wise, prudent or ethical for a court to adopt a reservation 
in complete ignorance of the impact of its decision on its fellow courts and on the 
harmony of the project of European integration. Careful exercise of judgment here 
would be necessary, and of course the power could be abused. But whether or not an 
‘acceptable balance’ could be achieved is contingent and complex. It requires attention 
to a substantive notion of equality between states, a concern for asymmetry in a Union 
in which not all courts (and not all states) are equally powerful; indeed, most obviously, 
to the fact that not all Member States have constitutional courts at all. 52 This kind of 
judgment may not be an appropriate one for any court to have to make. 53  
To understand the full complexity of the constitutional question of authority, we need, 
in other words, to go beyond an examination of the formal relations between the 
European Court of Justice and domestic constitutional courts and survey the evolving 
material constitution of the European Union.  
4. A problematic dualism 
The anti-pluralist argument misses its target because it disaggregates the juridical aspect of 
constitutionalism from its political aspect, resting entirely on an implicit but untenable form 
of dualism. In doing so, the anti-pluralist in fact mirrors much of the constitutional pluralist 
literature it is positioning itself against, a ‘myopic view’, which fails to consider the broader 
context of judicial decisions.54 OMT’s ramifications are far wider than the formal ruling on 
the supremacy of the Court’s authority. They go to the whole constitutional architecture of 
the Eurozone, as well as its socio-economic ideology, and its current political fragility.55 
                                                          
51 Joseph Weiler, although advancing the idea of constitutional tolerance, never endorsed the concept 
of constitutional pluralism and was a notable sceptic of the constitutional project. See e.g. J. H. H. Weiler, 
‘Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’ in J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds) European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2003).  
52 See M. Wilkinson, ‘Economic Messianism’, op. cit. 
53 This, indeed, was not Scharpf’s solution either, preferring a more political solution, allowing Member 
States to appeal to their peers in the European Council against a judgment of the ECJ, F. Scharpf, op. 
cit., 243. More recently, Scharpf has proposed a more radical set of changes in response to the Euro crisis, 
see F. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on European Multi-Level Democracy’ (2015) 21 European 
Law Journal 384–406.  
54 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay’ (2011) 
9 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 678–694. He adds that, ‘there has been a refusal to see the 
way in which the essential legal order of constitutional jurisprudence is part and parcel of the political 
democratic legitimacy crisis’, at 689. See also M. Wilkinson ‘Political Constitutionalism and the 
European Union’ (2013) 78 Modern Law Review, 191–222. 
55 See M. Wilkinson, ‘The Euro is Irreversible..!’, op. cit. 
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In short, the (anti-) pluralist literature takes note of a formal without a material con-
stitutionalism.56  Constitutional claims must be materially credible because they are 
claims over the lived world of experience, not only the formal world of legal rules. 
Otherwise, the divide between formal system and life-world can foment political and 
social disorder, and even grow to breaking point. Legal formalism then is in danger of 
looking like legal fetishism, divorced from the realities of political power and authority.   
If the new anti-pluralists are card-carrying legal fetishists, this is not, to be sure, a new 
phenomenon in the history of European integration. 57  After the failure of early 
attempts at political union, there was, it has been argued, an ‘opportune’ replacement 
of legal for political avenues towards integration, spearheaded by the European Court 
of Justice at the vanguard of a community of activist lawyers.58 European integration 
long masked an over-reliance on its juridical face: this was largely how the European 
Union ascended to ‘constitutional’ status in the academy. This legal fetishism worked 
to conceal the material weakness and brittleness of its political foundations and social 
supports.  
Yet implicit in the anti-pluralist account is in fact the claim that political foundations 
and social supports are maintained at a purely domestic level, and as long as 
membership is voluntarily continued this will continue to hold true. The basis for this 
claim is a crude version of the argument from consent.  
In order to examine this argument further, it is necessary to shift register, and consider 
constitutionalism through the lens of political authority. It is ironic here that the anti-
pluralists draw in their support on another critic of constitutional pluralism, but one 
whose argument is directed against the notion that constitutionalism is to be 
determined by judicial claims at all. 59  This serious objection to certain strands of 
constitutional pluralism advanced by Martin Loughlin is now harnessed, co-opted, by 
the anti-pluralists.60 In Loughlin’s reconstruction of the foundations of public law, 
constitutional development takes place through the dialectic of authority (potestas) and 
power (potentia); the generation of a belief in the authoritative ‘right to rule’ in 
conjunction with the actual capacity to compel obedience or attract allegiance to the 
political community. In modernity, this dialect involves material and subjective 
                                                          
56 The notion of a material constitution is developed in M. Goldoni and M. Wilkinson ‘The Material 
Constitution’, (2016) 20 Law, Society and Economy Working Paper Series.  
57 The fetishisation of constitutionalism in legal scholarship on European integration is warned about in 
Walker’s brand of constitutional pluralism, see N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, op. cit. 
58 See e.g. A. Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the Making 
of the EU Polity’, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, 1-28; A. Cohen, ‘Constitutionalism without 
Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Mobilisation and Legal Expertise in the Making of a 
Constitution For Europe (1940’s-1960’s)’ (2007) 32 Law and Social Enquiry, 109-135.  
59 See M. Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism 9–30.  
60 See D. Kelemen, op cit.  
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elements associated with the apparatus of statehood and the set of beliefs on which it 
rests, central to which is the ‘autonomy of the political domain’.61 
Loughlin’s reconstruction of this dialectic, essential to the foundations of public law as 
well as its modern evolution, need not be rehearsed in full here. Applied to the EU, the 
argument can be put in short form. For Loughlin, the combination of political incapacity 
and illegitimacy is decisive in rejecting constitutional claims for the EU’s governing 
authority. On the question of power (qua potentia) the claim proceeds by contrasting 
the material elements of statehood at the domestic level with their absence in the EU, 
particularly with regard to its lack of resources for the essential tasks of providing for 
the salus populi: welfare and warfare.62 There can be no ‘functional equivalence’ in light 
of the EU’s lack of powers of taxation and control of military forces, Loughlin argues.  
To this functional dimension, Loughlin adds a subjective element, which goes directly 
to the question of the governing relation between the rulers and the ruled. This 
demands a move beyond the legal text to consider by what ‘political right’ a 
governmental agency is able to act; to consider the set of arrangements ‘through which 
rulers and subjects express their beliefs about the authority of government’ and about 
that government’s ‘right to rule’. In short, there is the question of political loyalty and 
identity, which precedes any account of governmental powers and the way they are 
channelled through the constitution. In this foundational regard, the EU is similarly 
lacking, expressed by Loughlin through a version of the well-known ‘no demos 
thesis’.63 
In other words, Loughlin rejects constitutional pluralism not because ultimate legal 
authority is – or must become - vested uniquely in the ECJ, as the anti-pluralists 
contend, but because political authority remains uniquely vested in the Member States 
(as the anti-pluralists implicitly concur). Loughlin criticises the pluralist literature for 
falling into the normativist trap of conflating sovereignty and government: what is 
pooled or divided in the EU is the exercise of governmental powers, not sovereignty. 
                                                          
61 See M. Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); M. Loughlin, 
‘Political Jurisprudence’ (2016) 16 Foundations of Public Law, available at http://juspoliticum.com/article
/Political-Jurisprudence-1105.html  
62 According to Loughlin: ‘There is no question that the power of member states is considerably greater 
than the resources under the control of EU institutions; without the power of taxation or control of 
military forces, there can be no functional equivalence’, ‘Oxymoron’, op. cit., 18.  
63 Ibid. Laughlin adds that ‘[o]n the basis of this test, few can deny that the answer today to the critical 
constitutional question can clearly be given: authority – continuing sovereign authority –remains vested 
in member states. There exists, in this political understanding, no constitutional pluralism.’ This is a 
surprising claim for Loughlin to make, as he elsewhere develops a more dialectical or ‘reflexive’ account 
of the relationship between constitutional power and authority, fact and norm. See e.g. M. Loughlin, 
‘On Constituent Power’ in M. Wilkinson and M. Dowdle (eds) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). This is acknowledged by Loughlin himself, 
‘Oxymoron’, op. cit., 12. 
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Sovereignty, understood as ‘the ultimate power of the people to determine the form of 
constitution of the State’, can ‘entail membership of the EU or withdrawal from it’.64  
What we are to make of the project of integration in constitutional theoretical terms is 
then left rather underspecified in Loughlin’s account. 65  The new anti-pluralists, 
although rejecting the natural conclusion that constitutionalism is the wrong 
conceptual language to capture the nature of the EU, seize on his argument from 
‘ultimate authority’. Political authority does not drop out of their picture entirely; it is 
simply divorced from judicial authority and formalised as a preserve of the domestic 
constitutional state’s continuing right to ‘leave’. Their position seems, despite 
appearances, to be a sovereigntist one, in the sense of basing the legitimacy of 
integration on a formal notion of nation state consent and if necessary the complete 
withdrawal of that consent. There is little or no room for strong forms of contestation 
or dissent within the Union, at least from domestic courts; judicial normativism at the 
supranational level must prevail.66  
So despite arguing for an up-scaling of constitutional (qua juridical) authority the anti-
pluralists make no claim that political authority has fully (or even partially) shifted 
upwards in unison, or that a new European demos has emerged (or should emerge to 
accompany the juridical construct). On the contrary, whilst craving supremacy of 
supranational juridical authority, they fall back on the claim that political authority 
remains essentially domestic. Indeed, key to the anti-pluralist justification for 
unconditional EU juridical supremacy is that this is constitutionally balanced because 
ultimate political authority remains with the member states, as evidenced in their right 
to withdraw (formalised since the Lisbon Treaty in Article 50 TEU). Their point, put 
bluntly, is that if a member state objects to EU juridical supremacy, there is an obvious 
route: the exit door.  
The strength of this position lies in its simplicity. But therein also lies its weakness. 
There may be no ‘knock-down’ argument against equating the voluntariness of the 
association with its lack of ultimate political authority (although some particular 
caveats to this will be explored below). The EU is not yet a federal state in which 
secession would be forcefully prevented. It may never become one, which is not to say 
that elements of cajoling and coercing have been lacking in respect of those considering 
exit, from ‘Grexit’ to ‘Brexit’. We will return to these critical constitutional phenomena 
in the next part, as they suggest that any formal approach to consent and coercion miss 
the transformational character of European integration.  
But for the moment, consider that this ‘dualist’ argument – supranational normative 
authority is balanced by national political authority – is a new, if less nuanced, version 
of an older account of the dynamics of integration, presented by Joseph Weiler in ‘The 
                                                          
64 See, M. Loughlin, ‘Why Sovereignty?’, in R. Rawlings, P. Leyland and A. Young (eds) Sovereignty and 
the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34–50, 47. 
65  See M. Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 47–73. See also the final chapter of M. Loughlin, 
Foundations, op. cit, which hints at integration as a feature of the rise of the administrative state in the 20th century.  
66 Although, as noted earlier, Kelemen’s position allows for a declaration of incompatibility. 
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Transformation of Europe’ in 1992. In Weiler’s account, building on Hirschmann’s 
scheme of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’,67 European integration initially developed along 
the lines of a two-track process, a fortuitous duality of normative supranationalism 
and political inter-governmentalism, which had a propensity to achieve an 
equilibrium.68 Accordingly, the EU functioned with an idiosyncratic but productive 
split between normative authority, which became strongly centralised through the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence, and political power, which remained predominantly with the 
component national units of the Member States. It was precisely because the Member 
States remained in control of the basic contents of the arrangement that they were 
willing to surrender control of its legal enforcement, which anyway depended not only 
on the ECJ, but also on national courts’ acquiescence as a feature of the uniquely 
decentralised judicial architecture. In short, political voice prevented the need for exit 
(rather than the possibility of exit mitigating the absence of voice).69  
Even on its own terms, Weiler’s framework was meant to explain the maintenance of 
equilibrium without resorting to ‘exit’, not to fall back on the possibility of exit as 
evidence of an imaginary current equilibrium. Equilibrium was maintained by 
preserving the domestic ‘voice’ of national political authority through formal and 
informal mechanisms internal to the EU’s constitutional architecture, through its 
multi-dimensional institutional set-up and procedures of law-making and law-
applying – including the continuing authority of domestic (constitutional) courts.70 
The point is that these various features protected the authority of member states 
formally as well as informally, and paid some attention to the material discrepancies 
in power between member states. These various mechanisms, intended to facilitate 
voice, would permit the suspension of the question of exit, and of sovereignty itself.  
To fall back on positing that the ultimate authority to leave (or renegotiate membership) 
remains with the member states tell us nothing about the material conditioning of 
political authority – the other face of constitutional development - in the interim. Can 
we say no more about political authority than that it is held in store for a moment of except-
ional and final decision: to remain and accept juridical hierarchy or to leave and reject it?  
The argument of the anti-pluralists here echoes the language of Schmitt’s 
constitutional theory of the ‘federation’ (or ‘Bund’) – an entity in between a loose 
confederation of sovereign states, on the one hand, and a fully-fledged federal state on 
                                                          
67 For the classic statement of this duality and its evolution in the early years of integration, see J. H. H. 
Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1992) 100 Yale Law Journal, 2403–2483. See also J. H. H. Weiler, 
explaining the early equilibrium and balance achieved through this duality, ‘The Community System: 
The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 Yearbook of European Law, 267–306. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Note that formal legal avenue of exit only existed as a matter of EU law with the Lisbon Treaty, Article 50 
TEU.  
70 The BVerfG has been described as a missing channel for German’s to voice their Euro-scepticism, see 
e.g. K. F. Garditz, ‘Beyond Symbolism: Towards a Constitutional Actio Popularis in EU affairs? A 
Commentary on the OMT Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 
183-201. 
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the other (between a Staatenbund and Bundesstaat).71In this arrangement, sovereignty 
does not disappear; neither is it pooled or divided; rather it is suspended. But this is a 
provisional status. It will inevitably reappear in a time of crisis or in the moment of 
exception: the federation is an inherently unstable phenomenon and will eventually 
dissolve downwards or evolve upwards. Which way it is resolved is determined for 
Schmitt by the political condition of homogeneity; it is this that will determine whether 
political unity will be re-asserted at the level of the federation or of its member states.72  
Did OMT signify the moment at which the federation either turns into a federal state 
where the central unit is sovereign, or disintegrates into a confederation where the 
members are sovereign? The reality was more prosaic, Karlsruhe again backing down 
subject to retaining its overall authority over the way the programme is handled, were 
it to be triggered in practice. The compromise on ultimate authority is, once again 
retained in theory, at least for the time being. 
But for the anti-pluralists this can only delay the inevitable. Constitutional pluralism 
is eventually bound to fail and the EU will either mature into a federal unit or dissolve 
into a con-federal one. With Schmitt, any third alternative is ultimately consigned to 
the graveyard, the chronicle of a death foretold. Characteristic of the prevailing 
normativism in the legal academy, this momentous decision, however, is now entirely 
subsumed into the juridical question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Judicial authority alone 
is up-scaled, political authority is untouched. It is an odd echo of Schmitt, transfigured 
into a realm where norms and facts, law and politics, are entirely uncoupled.73 
The notion that the EU’s own constitutional future has been definitively settled by the 
OMT ruling is belied by any constitutional reality check. There are immense 
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces acting on the process of integration. OMT 
hardly resolves this; it is a stop-gap solution to cover deeper structural design flaws in 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The notion that the EU has ‘matured’ into a 
federal unit as a result of its recent evolution is hard to reconcile with its increasingly 
fractious divisions and existential uncertainties.74 These of course extend far beyond 
even the problems in the Eurozone, as the ‘Brexit’ referendum as well as constitutional 
                                                          
71 C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory [trans. J. Seitzer] (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). See also O. 
Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération, 2nd ed, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009); C. Schönberger, 
‘Die Europäische Union als Bund’ (2004) 1 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts; R. Schütze, ‘Federalism as 
Constitutional Pluralism: “Letters from America”’ in M. Avbelj and J. Komarek (eds), op. cit.; M. Avbelj, 
‘Theory of European Union’ (2011) 36 European Law Review, 818-836.  
72 For discussion see S. Larsen, ‘United in Diversity: Humanism, Homogeneity and Hegemony’ in G. 
Baruchello, J. D. Rendtorff and A. Sorenson (eds) Ethics, Democracy and Markets: Nordic Perspectives on World 
Problems (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2016). This was the term picked up by the German court in its 
Maastricht Urteil, albeit citing Heller rather than Schmitt, see J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Maastricht Decision’ op. cit. 
73 It is a mirror image of the approach taken by Dieter Grimm, see D. Grimm ‘Sovereignty in the 
European Union’ in J. Van der Walt and J. Ellsworth (eds), op. cit. 
74 For a compelling account based on political economic dysfunctionalities in the Eurozone, see W. 
Streeck, Buying Time, op. cit.; and F. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash’, op. cit. For a dissection of the various crises 
constituting the Euro crisis, see A. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’ (2013) 14 German 
Law Journal, 453-526 
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crises in Poland and Hungary demonstrate, in different ways.75 But the significance of 
the single currency should not be understated; its fate has been linked to the survival 
of the project of integration itself (‘if the Euro fails, Europe fails’).76 Underlying the 
OMT conflict was a material dispute over the meaning of this symbolic unity.  
5. Constitutionalism: a material phenomenon 
Any rigid distinction between judicial and political authority is tenable only in a 
perfectly stable and concrete constitutional order, where a division of powers has been 
set in stone. It is doubtful that any such order exists outside of the normative jurist’s 
imagination. In its absence – i.e. for the purposes of capturing constitutional dynamics 
– a relational conception of the interdependence of law and politics, power and authority, 
fact and norm, is essential.77 This is particularly significant in a compound polity 
where the division of authority between component and relatively autonomous 
entities struggling for power and recognition is deeply contested.  
The implicit dualism adopted by the anti-pluralist conceals the dynamism of 
integration as a matter of material constitutional change. Its form of political 
voluntarism ignores the transformations of statehood and political authority that have 
occurred through the process of integration, and especially in the Eurozone since 
Maastricht. 78  The narrative of a split between political and normative authority, even 
if plausible as an account of the early foundation of European integration from the 
1960’s to the 1980’s, struggles with the growing complexity and intertwinement of the 
normative and political pillars that occurs from the Single European Act onwards. The 
project of the Economic and Monetary Union, where far more than merely ‘normative’ 
authority is supranationalised – monetary authority transferring to a central bank and 
in the absence of any formal route of exit from the single currency – changes the 
material dynamic irrevocably.  
These are not merely ‘superstructural’ transformations of governmental powers, 
leaving a statist ‘base’ untouched, to borrow the old Marxian terminology. This does 
not mean that the governing arrangements of the EU are fixed and permanent and any 
authority to withdraw is entirely illusory. It is that, pace Loughlin, these governing 
arrangements reflect a process of state transformation, the result of changes to the 
dynamic of potentia and potestas. There is a point at which a delegation of power 
                                                          
75 For a broad overview of the existential problems facing Europe, see e.g. C. Gearty, ‘The State of 
Freedom in Europe’ (2016) 21 European Law Journal, 706–721.  
76 See e.g. Der Spiegel, ‘If Euro Fails, So Will the Idea of European Union’, 13 May 2010, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-warns-of-europe-s-collapse-if-euro-fails-so-
will-the-idea-of-european-union-a-694696.html  
77 See e.g. Loughlin, Foundations, op. cit., chapter 10.  
78 See C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter, ‘The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration 
in the Post-Maastricht Era’ (2015) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies, 703–722. 
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materialises into its surrender, or to adopt Weiler’s metaphor, the Golem turns on its 
own creators.79  
To insist on the right of ‘exit’ as evidence of ultimate domestic political authority 
(suggestive of any provisional ‘equilibrium’) singularly fails to capture the dynamic of 
European and state constitutional development as part of a single movement. This 
interdependence is central to the trajectory of the post-war European state and its 
reconstitution over time.80 In focusing on the retention of an untrammelled political 
authority to withdraw, this transformation – a profound, albeit uneven, constitutional 
transformation of the post-war European state – is elided. 
To get a firmer conceptual purchase on this process, we can turn to the work of Chris 
Bickerton, who captures the transformation in the post-war European state from a 
‘nation state’ to a ‘member state’. 81  Bickerton’s account largely tracks the 
transformation in the political constitution of the state in the period following the 
‘golden age’ of economic prosperity, which coincides with the beginning of the period 
usually characterised as ‘neo-liberal’. This process of rewriting the terms of the post-
war social contract accelerates after the Treaty of Maastricht, cementing the disconnect 
between state and society, opening up a growing ‘void’ in the ruling arrangements.82 
Bickerton’s analysis is invaluable because of the way it captures European integration 
as integral to the change in state-society relations.83 
But the marks of material and ideological transformation pre-date the Treaty of 
Maastricht and even the neo-liberal turn of the mid 1970’s. Most significantly, the 
domestic constitution in the immediate post-war period, particularly in those 
countries devastated by the interwar breakdown of liberal constitutionalism and the 
turn to fascism, is re-founded on a commitment to internationalism and a European 
Union that is integrated, and even entrenched, in the domestic constitutional culture 
as well as in formal constitutional obligations. In the idiom of constitutional theory, 
the language of constitutional rights and constitutional identity increasingly subsumes 
the idea of constituent power. Social democracy is replaced by ‘restrained democracy’, 
as Jan-Werner Müller explains. The project of European integration is central (if far 
from exclusively relevant) to these substitutions.84   
                                                          
79 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Editorial – 60 Years Since the First European Community: Reflections on Political 
Messianism’ (2011) 222 European Journal of International Law, 303, 308.  
80 See M. Wilkinson ‘The Reconstitution of Post-war Europe: Liberal Excesses, Democratic Deficiencies’ in M. 
Dowdle and M. Wilkinson (eds) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017) 
81 C. J. Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-state to Member State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
82 This claim builds on P. Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (London: Verso, 2013).  
83 As C. J. Bickerton puts it: ‘in contrast to traditional nation states, national governments of member states 
understand their power and identity as dependent upon their belonging to a wider group or community’, 
European Integration, op. cit., 12. This account is also able to explain the more recent backlash against this political 
disconnect, exemplified by ‘Brexit’ but far from restricted to the UK. See C. J. Bickerton, ‘Europe in Revolt’, 
Prospect Magazine, December 13 2016, available at https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/europe-
in-revolt  
84 J-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe (Princeton University Press, 2011).  
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Leaving the EU, in other words, is just not part of the domestic constitutional 
imagination for many, if not most, European states (the United Kingdom is a 
significant exception to this, not least due to the inherent flexibility of its own 
constitutional arrangements and distinct constitutional culture). 85  European 
integration is not like any other international treaty commitment; it is constitutional in 
kind, as even the Supreme Court in the UK recognised in its Miller judgement.86 If 
commitment to integration in core countries, such as any of the ‘founding 6’ or those 
whose entry into the EU signalled a transition from dictatorship to liberal democracy, 
were to end, it would signal a radical material constitutional change. It could well 
mark the end of the era of ‘restrained democracy’, or ‘post-sovereignty’ that begins 
with post-war reconstruction.87 To put it differently, it would mark the return of a 
classical understanding of sovereignty that was thought to have been superseded in 
the post-war constitutional era.  
To be sure, continuation of the project of integration should not be taken for granted, 
as growing Euro-scepticism even in core states demonstrates. But simplistic appeals to 
political voluntarism (a formal authority to exit) elide the constitutional 
transformation that integration reflects, and entails. For the countries of the Eurozone 
especially, crucial levers of power-generating authority have in effect been 
surrendered, without any full-fledged replacement at the EU level. This is increasingly 
asymmetric, reflecting the powers of debtor and creditor countries in the bargaining 
over conditionality. Voice has been retained, but only by some; for others, neither voice 
nor exit is straightforwardly available.88 The ideological commitment to European 
integration must be kept in view as reflecting a change not only in capacity but also in 
the set of beliefs about the nature of the ruling relationship.  
The significance of this approach is to impress that there is no ‘zero sum game’ in terms 
of the generation of power and authority between the domestic and supranational sites. 
Potestas and potentia are interdependent. To the extent that the OMT saga (along with 
other transformations in the Eurozone) reflects a new set of beliefs about the governing 
relationship between rulers and ruled, they go not only to the issue of judicial 
authority of the ECJ but also of the monetary authority (and capacity) of the ECB in 
response to the sovereign debt crisis and to the continuing sovereign authority of the 
member states.  
OMT, in other words, along with other developments in the Eurozone, contributes to 
a restructuring of the material constitutional dynamic, in this case by empowering the 
ECB as an effective ‘lender of last resort’, whilst maintaining its concurrent role in 
                                                          
85 See M. Wilkinson, ‘The Brexit Referendum and the Crisis of Extreme Centrism’ (2016) 17 German Law 
Journal, 131–142. 
86  In the recent Miller judgment, the Supreme Court made clear that becoming a member of the 
European Union entailed a constitutional change for the United Kingdom, and thus so would it 
renouncing membership, thereby requiring the authorisation of Parliament. See R v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
87 ‘Post-sovereignty’ is the description given by N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and 
Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 142.  
88 See M. Wilkinson, ‘Economic Messianism’, op. cit.  
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economic policy as part of the ‘Troika’ in the European Stability Mechanism. 89  It 
augments the discretionary power of an increasingly powerful institution but one that 
looks increasingly political and geo-political in its manner of interference and even 
coercion of member states seeking financial rescue, both in its role in the Troika, and 
in its control of the money supply.90  
The formal voluntariness of the association of the EU cannot disguise the fact that there 
is no formal legal avenue for voluntary exit (or involuntary expulsion) from the 
Eurozone itself. It was in fact on this ‘irreversibility’ of the currency that Draghi 
insisted in order to justify the rationality of the OMT programme.91 Bearing in mind 
subsequent developments in the case of Greece – specifically the ‘Oxi’ referendum of 
2015 followed by capitulation to the creditors’ demands and the tabling of an 
involuntary ‘Grexit’ by Wolfgang Schaüble – we have to question the extent to which 
this justification remains credible.92  
6. A constitutional conjuncture: the threat to constitutional 
pluralism 
Far from reaching constitutional maturity or experiencing a federal moment as the 
anti-pluralists contend, the present period is more appositely characterised as a 
constitutional conjuncture. This captures a complex matrix of opposing material forces 
and a series of potential ‘constitutional moments’. It may prove to be a decisive point 
in the future trajectory of the project of integration but as of yet, the final destination 
is unclear.  
What is clear is that constitutional pluralism is indeed under threat in this period, 
albeit not for the reasons advanced by the anti-pluralists. Much more than competing 
judicial authority is at stake; the entire edifice of liberal constitutionalism is threatened, 
as sovereignty, populism and political extremism return, now in relation not only to 
the Euro crisis but also in reaction to the security crisis and the migrant crisis as well 
as the ‘Brexit’ referendum. The disintegration of the European project is mooted in a 
way that would have been inconceivable only a decade ago.  
There is no place here to evaluate the full impact of these multiple crises or even only 
of the Euro crisis on the constitution of the EU, or the mutation that has arguably taken 
place in its governing arrangements and the impact of this on the exercise of legitimate 
authority in the Eurozone. 93 But if we focus on OMT from a material constitutional 
                                                          
89 Which the Advocate General Cruz Villalon in OMT cautioned against, Gauveiler, opinion, op. cit.  
90 Most obviously in its threats to freeze liquidity during the Greek crisis of 2015.  
91 The justification for intervention in OMT was the irrationality of the spreads on government bonds, 
irrational because based on the non-existent risk of convertibility in case of break-up of the single 
currency. This logic was rejected by the German court.  
92 For a fuller narrative of these events, see M. Wilkinson, ‘The Euro is Irreversible’, op. cit. 
93 See e.g. C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: the Degradation of Basic Legal 
Values in Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 325–353; A. Menéndez, ‘The Crisis 
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perspective, it provides an illuminating test case for the constitutional politics of crisis 
in the Eurozone, a microcosm of the broader tensions.  
The first thing to note is that there is nothing unusual in governmental branches 
resorting to extraordinary measures – formal as well as informal – in times of crisis or 
emergency in an attempt to restore order, security, or a return to economic normality; 
nor in a relatively compliant judiciary. 94 The situation in the compound polity of the 
EU is more complex, as there is no single ‘Guardian of the European Constitution’ to 
reassert its identity in times of crisis, but numerous and competing contenders: the 
Commission, the ECJ, domestic constitutional courts, the European Parliament, 
national parliaments, the ECB, the Bundesbank, the Franco-German political axis, or at 
least one half of it – no doubt others could be imagined. The decision of the ECB to 
pursue the OMT is an example of how a ‘non-political’ (or technocratic) institution 
took up the slack, suspending normal rules (the division between monetary and 
economic authority) and using extraordinary measures, offering itself in effect as a 
lender of last resort in an attempt to restore and maintain normality qua currency 
stability and financial stability more generally, serving the second order telos of 
survival ‘of the euro as a whole’.95  
But all of this tells us little about the substantive nature of the constitutional crisis in the 
Eurozone. At root, OMT reflects in miniature the material conflict between the need to 
keep the ‘singleness’ of the currency and also to avoid the solidarity required to sustain 
it. We need to turn to this dimension of the crisis to appreciate the full significance of 
the current constitutional conjuncture.  
The OMT programme of the ECB is an attempt to plug the political gap created by 
EMU, which established an incomplete structure of monetary without fiscal union. 
This arrangement was based on a combination of market logic (no bail-out or monetary 
financing) and soft power (the stability and growth pact) to ensure that fiscal 
responsibility would be maintained by member states on the one hand and belief in 
the irreversibility of the currency, which led to the levelling of sovereign spreads on 
the other. When the sovereign debt crisis hit, it seemed that one of these had to give.   
OMT, in conjunction with ESM, in effect, performs the job of ensuring that the market 
logic on which EMU was based (the market setting rates on the basis that member 
states would default in their debts to private creditors) would not run its course, or at 
least would be seriously mitigated. Thus, the no bailout clause became a conditional 
bailout clause with ex post formal modification of the Treaty. But in order to put into 
effect what would be required by market logic, to act as if the market were in charge, 
austerity is demanded. Market ‘justice’ therefore prevails in spite of all the promises 
                                                          
of Law and the European Crises: From the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat to the Consolidating State 
of (Peudo-)technocratic Governance’ (2017) 44 Journal of Law and Society, 56–78.  
94 See generally V. Ramraj, ‘No Doctrine More Pernicious? Emergencies and the Limits of Legality’ in V. 
Ramraj (ed.) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3–29.  
95  See K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Euro-Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). The notion of justifying OMT as an exceptional measure in order to return to 
normality was prominent in the Advocate General’s opinion in OMT, Gauweiler, opinion, op. cit. 
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to the contrary in the written and unwritten principles of European integration, from 
solidarity to the protection of social rights.  
The ECJ, in its OMT ruling, was confronted with a genuine dilemma. The dilemma, 
however, is not merely juridical or formal; it reflects a material constitutional struggle 
between austerity and solidarity. On the one hand, there is the risk of violating market 
logic (creating ‘moral hazard’) that arises in the case of assistance.96 On the other hand, 
there is the risk of break-up of the single currency and contagion if there were no 
rescue of countries in financial difficulty. The teleological justification for the ECB’s 
bond-buying programme – the ‘irreversibility’ of the Euro – came up against the ordo-
liberal commitment to market rationality.97   
Considered in broader constitutional context, the OMT saga thus reveals the 
precariousness of two structural edifices of the Economic and Monetary Union: fiscal 
discipline and the irreversibility of the Euro. If the first pushes against solidarity 
because assistance incentivises imprudent economic management, the second pulls in 
its favour, at least as far as rescue is necessary to avoid default or exit. So far, the duty 
of rescue has prevailed, partly because it has been considered expedient to do so for 
political-economic reasons and partly on the basis of a higher duty to protect the Euro 
as a whole. But above all it has prevailed because the tension has been resolved on 
terms – influenced by a Euro-group led by Germany, along with the ‘Troika’ of 
institutions (ECB, Commission and IMF) – that have been able to maintain the ideology 
of ‘austerity’.98  
OMT threatens this tense balance because, in practice, it threatens rescue without 
conditionality, having effects (particularly in Spain and Italy) without ever having to 
be triggered and therefore unaccompanied by any formal ‘rescue programme’. And it 
shifts control over this terms of this balance from the creditor Member States and the 
‘Troika’ to an essentially EU institution, perhaps the sole truly federal institution, the 
ECB.  But the ECB’s programme works in a manner that is insensitive to the demands 
of powerful creditor states or at least functions outside of their strict control and 
management. This is the key to understanding its challenge in the German 
constitutional court. 
The ECJ does its best to assuage both concerns, to avoid having to make a political 
decision in favour of functionalist discretion on the one hand or ordo-liberal rule-
following on the other. It defers to the ECB’s expert rationale for its mandate to do 
                                                          
96 It is notable that the discourse on moral hazard tends to be one-sided, focusing on the risk in dis-incentivising 
prudent economic management on the part of the public debtor and neglecting the risk in incentivising the 
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Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
97 On the rationality and irrationality of market logic in this area see H. Schepel, ‘The Bank, the Bond 
and the Bail-Out: On the Legal Construction of Market Discipline in the Eurozone’ (2017) 44 Journal of 
Law and Society, 79 – 98. .  
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‘everything it takes’ to save the Euro, but insists that the ECB’s bond-buying promise 
does not jeopardise the commitments to fiscal discipline and avoidance of moral 
hazard, because the link between rescue and conditionality can be maintained if the 
programme were actually to be triggered. 
These tensions have yet to be fully resolved. The ECJ’s ruling in OMT merely prolongs 
the tense stalemate over this political economic battle, fudging the issue so both 
functionalism and ordo-liberalism can live to fight another day. On its final return to 
Karlsruhe, the German court’s message was clear: less deference to the ECB, more sur-
veillance over the use of its discretion.99 Far from representing a decisive federal moment, 
it therefore serves the aim of ‘kicking the can down the road’ or ‘extending and pretending’. 
There is, however, an indication as to how the impasse between functionalism and 
ordo-liberalism might ultimately be traversed, revealed through close attention to the 
management of the Greek crisis of 2015. The election of Syriza in Greece in January 
2015 tested the impasse, and indirectly the capacity of Europe to defend constitutional 
pluralism, pushing the tension between austerity and irreversibility (nearly!) to a 
breaking point. The authority of the Euro areas leading powers to pursue austerity 
was contested in a domestic setting in which it had been unequivocally rejected by an 
electorate. On the other hand, in Schmittian fashion, an enemy of the ordo-liberal 
ideology had been explicitly identified, those ‘bad Europeans’ who disregard the 
economic stability criteria.100 What was an impersonal contest between ideas was in 
danger of turning into a political and geo-political contest of ideologies with clearly 
marked constituencies, pitting nation against nation. 
The outcome was less determined by the ECJ’s insistence on juridical authority and 
more by the EU’s insistence (as articulated by the Euro-group, the ECJ, the ECB and 
the President of the European Council) on ordo-liberalism as the ideological 
touchstone of the Eurozone.101 ‘Grexit’ could then be used less as a threat by the Greeks 
to regain authority and more as a threat by the Eurozone to maintain control. We 
therefore have to consider the other possibility in the constitutional politics being 
played out behind the juridical battles: the possibility that a state might effectively be forced 
to leave.102 In the immediate context of OMT, this casts doubt on the ECJ’s substantive agree-
ment with the ECB’s rationale for the OMT programme: the irreversibility of the Euro, at 
least for one member state.  
The political placing of ‘Grexit’ on the table in the context of the recent Greek debacle 
thus threatens to alter the nature of the project of integration, dispelling the illusion 
that the Euro is irreversible for each and every country. It was this claim, in the view 
of the ECB, which justified interfering in sovereign spreads, which were irrationally 
pricing in the threat of ‘Grexit’, and the concomitant possibility of debt 
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100 See U. di Fabio, ‘Karlsruhe Makes a Referral’, (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 107–110.  
101  See ‘The Donald Tusk Interview: the annotated transcript’, Financial Times, 16 July 2015, available at 
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redenomination. If ‘Grexit’ is a real possibility, then the ECB’s (and ECJ’s) justificatory 
rationale for OMT is shattered. Although it is too early to say precisely where this will 
end, it signposts an as yet uncharted mutation in the constitution of EMU: the Euro is 
irreversible not in its composition, but in its ideology.103 In other words, when push 
comes to shove, austerity wins. The Euro is reversible, at least for some; what is not 
reversible is its ordo-liberal commitment to price stability, competitiveness and the 
avoidance of moral hazard. In practice, however, this begins to look less like 
functionalism or ordo-liberalism, and more like a new version of imperialism.  
Does this signal the end of constitutional pluralism in the material, political sense? 
Resolution of the dilemma was ultimately deferred, since the Greeks capitulated on 
their own accord after the ‘Oxi’ referendum and Greece remains, hanging by its 
threads. The non-event of ‘Grexit’ laid bare the apparent intransigence of the domestic 
constitutional imaginary that binds the state to the project of European integration. 
OMT contributed to prolonging this story, less in Greece than in Spain and Italy, as 
now does the QE that has come to replace it. The ECJ’s ruling simply confers an added 
longevity to a status quo which looks increasingly unsustainable, ‘buying time’, but at 
what long-term cost?  
The story continues. However, on the management of the crises it is difficult to 
disagree with the perception of Jürgen Habermas: the treatment of Greece looked like 
an ‘act of punishment’ against a left-wing government that dared openly to 
rhetorically oppose austerity whilst promoting its continuing belief in the project of 
European integration. 104  It was this management that pushed the limits of 
constitutional tolerance and called seriously into question the possibility of 
constitutional pluralism in the European Union as currently configured. 
Constitutional theory now has to take into account the increasing material dis-
equilibrium in the project of integration. 
7. Reframing constitutional pluralism 
What then can be said of constitutional pluralism after these reconfigurations of 
political power and authority? Constitutional pluralism is needed now more than ever, 
but in a different sense from that advanced by its protagonists. It should be reframed 
as a response to the question of how a ‘horizontal plurality’ of political orders and 
heterogonous political economies can constitutionally co-exist. If, in the thinnest sense, 
OMT keeps constitutional pluralism barely alive by retaining the possibility of 
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competing visions of integration, it does so by leaving unresolved the constitutional 
conundrum inherent in the tension between ordo-liberalism and solidarity.   
The challenge for constitutional pluralism, in other words, is different from that high-
lighted by many of its proponents (as well as detractors). Rather than a question of 
whether national constitutionalism can coexist with a putative European con-
stitutionalism, as determined by claims to ultimate authority of their respective 
judicial branches, the pressing question, revealed in force since the Euro crisis, is how 
national constitutionalisms can materially co-coexist with each other in a European 
Union that does more than pay lip-service to its foundational values of democracy and 
solidarity, not to mention the various proclamations of social rights.105 With rescue 
funds viewed in zero-sum terms, a constitution that protects democratic authority in 
Germany can conflict with one that protects social rights in Greece or Portugal, as well 
as conflict with the ‘constitution’ of EU law defended by the ECJ.  
What this means in practical terms is to ask the following: what kind of institutional 
arrangements and substantive commitments are required of European integration in 
order to permit and foster collective co-existence? How, to put it crudely, can German con-
stitutional values co-exist with Greek constitutional values, where one seems increasingly 
to proscribe what the other demands and vice versa? ‘Tolerance’ alone will no longer be 
sufficient to deal with this; solidarity is required.  
If we accept that the European Union is a constitutional unit, however divided and fra-
ctured, but one in which the autonomy of the component parts are equally valued, and 
indeed continue to form the basic political and social material out of which integration 
evolves, then constitutional pluralism remains of paramount importance. Its significance 
can be illustrated with an example germane to the OMT dispute, taken from the vexed issue 
of the constitutionality of austerity programmes in light of their alleged incompatibility 
with socio-economic rights.106 A great deal of attention has thus been given to the problems 
of ESM and OMT from the perspective of the creditor states, or at least one creditor state. 
These programmes have been challenged for violating the budgetary autonomy of the 
Bundestag and therefore the right to vote of the German citizen, guaranteed ultimately 
by virtue of the Eternity Clause of the German Basic Law. Recall that the concern of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht was the potential that OMT could bypass conditionality, 
a concern rhetorically assuage by the ECJ. But what about the effect of the very same 
conditionality on the debtor states? As Claire Kilpatrick puts it, ‘imagine if these cases 
concerning breaches of fundamental rights had come before German courts […]’107 
Constitutional plurality, where constitutionalism can continue to be understood 
through the lens of political authority (and not determined by geo-political power or 
economic rationality), requires a reconfiguration of political – and specifically 
democratic – power at all levels of government. Constitutional plurality, in other 
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words, requires quite particular material conditions of European unity and solidarity; 
but until a pan-European democratic unity emerges, which at present looks unlikely, 
this requires sensitivity to the question of political authority in an asymmetrical 
community of member-states, to the material conditions of possibility of constitutional 
pluralism within the project of European integration. 
To get a firmer grasp of the concrete conditions for constitutional ‘plurality in unity’ 
to be maintained it is helpful to turn to Schmitt’s protagonist in the battles of late 
Weimar, Herman Heller. In Schmitt’s view, recall, the federation as a mid-way 
between the loose confederation and the federal state was an inherently unstable 
construct. What would ultimately determine its fate would be the question of political 
homogeneity; in the exceptional moment when the presence or absence of homogeneity 
would determine whether the federation would dissolve into a loose confederation or 
evolve into a federal state.108  
Heller, however, had offered a quite different understanding of the necessary 
condition of homogeneity, as an issue of relative socio-economic equality (or 
inequality); for political unity to be maintained, at least the prospect of socio-economic 
equality must be credibly offered as possible goal within the parameters of the 
constitutional order. Nationalism, in Heller’s view, was an antidote to the tendency of 
a capitalist economy towards inequality, offering a sense of unity that would conceal 
(rather than resolve) class divisions. But this could only be a temporary fix.109  
As equality seems increasingly unachievable in conditions of advanced capitalism; 
indeed, on Piketty’s analysis, is structurally precluded in the normal run of capitalist 
development, it might turn out that constitutional democracy is incompatible with 
capitalism and some alternative to one or the other will have to emerge (if it hasn’t 
already).110 In the EU, the question of equality, or at least the prospect of such, matters not 
only within but also between states: within the EU is there a regional construct, which 
aspires to transcend the merely formal sovereign equality that pertains in international 
relations. 111  
The aspiration to maintain a politically equal association may of course prove to be 
disappointed. If so, the likely scenario is a disintegration of the project in conditions 
that would leave constitutional pluralism hanging entirely on the threads of a de-
institutionalised, regional geo-political and global market system, or, from a constitutional 
perspective, a disorder (or non-system). A return to a situation of radical pluralism between 
nation states might bring opportunities, but it would surely bring more or as many risks.  
                                                          
108 See Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, op. cit.  
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Paying serious attention to questions of complex inequalities in order to maintain a 
transnational constitutional order based on political autonomy looks like an uphill task 
from where the EU is right now. The long-term trajectory remains unclear. But what 
is clear is that polarising between formal legal equality guaranteed by ECJ supremacy 
at one end, and the political right to withdraw at the other, is insufficient. A balance 
must exist not only vertically, between national and supranational authority, but 
horizontally, between domestic constitutional authorities.  
In any quasi-federal system where the identity not only of the individual person, but also 
of the constituent parts matters and is considered necessary to protect through formal 
mechanisms, there are two fundamental principles which remain in delicate tension with 
one another: equality of persons and equality of states. 112  Without a genuine sense of 
member state equality, the federation is liable to shade into a hegemonic entity, dominated 
by a single state, or a bloc of states, and even to evoke imperialism in its political form.113 
To highlight this challenge is to suggest that we are, in a significant way, back to where 
we started, at the post-war origins of the integration process, where the issue of 
reconciling and strengthening the political authority of the states assumed greater 
significance than that of creating a supranational substitute. This was largely because 
of the historical condensation of political and social forces that emerged through the 
post-war settlement; the situation now is quite different in its particulars, and the 
challenges much greater in a Union of 28, but the basic issue remains the same. 
8. Conclusion 
If constitutional pluralism has been suspended, or seriously injured through the reaction to 
the financial crisis, this may not be for the reasons suspected by its gravediggers. Focusing 
only on the judicial theatre of OMT, they have missed the more significant material con-
stitutional play occurring in the background. The final act is yet to pass; but if not the chronicle 
of a death foretold, the project of integration increasingly resembles a dead man walking.  
Europe, it must be noted in conclusion, has never been as disunited as it is now: not only 
voluntary ‘Brexit’ but also involuntary ‘Grexit’ has been mooted. There are also increasing 
concerns about respect for basic constitutional values of democracy and the rule of law in 
Hungary, and more recently, in Poland, which have led to arguments over whether the EU 
has the authority as well as the institutional capacity to intervene domestically in areas of 
basic constitutional concern.114 It is worth noting too, that in contrast to the apparent 
willingness of the EU to micromanage the perceived threat to austerity in Greece, it appears 
rather impotent to manage the growing threat to the rule of law from the authoritarian 
illiberalism in Hungary and Poland, which has been left to emerge without facing effective 
constraints. This poses a threat not just to the principles of economic and monetary union 
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but also to the foundational values of the EU as protected in Article 2 TEU. It may prove a 
greater challenge to the project than the voluntary exit of the United Kingdom.  
These divisions will not be resolved – but could quite possibly be aggravated – by 
unqualified judicial assertions of the supremacy of EU law or normativist 
proclamations of the overwhelming force of legality. If, for example, German ordo-liberal 
constitutional ideology, operationalised to preclude solidarity (under the rubric of avoiding 
moral hazard), no longer seems compatible with constitutional democracy in other parts of 
the Eurozone, particularly when Germany makes having trade surplus a ‘de facto reason of 
state’, then this will not be overcome by judicial fiat.115 It will only be addressed by serious 
institutional reform and social mobilisation that lends credence to a democratic 
transnational solidarity.  
If democracy in the EU must be understood no longer as a right, but as a reward for 
fiscal discipline, it needs to be made clear that this is a reward that could realistically 
only ever be offered to some under current political and economic conditions. The im-
movable object of ordo-liberalism threatens to meet head-on the irresistible force of 
functional economic integration, neither shows any concern for the value of dem-
ocratic constitutionalism nor of constitutional pluralism across the EU. This will only 
lead to further backlashes against the project.   
The idea of constitutional pluralism alone will not be able to resolve problems of a 
material, geopolitical and political-economic nature. However, it can be reframed in a way 
that demands more sensitivity to the material dynamics of political authority and complex 
political equality in the compound polity that is the European Union. Without serious at-
tention to the demands of constitutional pluralism the European Union will struggle to 
maintain the levels of political solidarity and social support that are required for the survival 
of its animating ideals.  
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